show how they developed their *poder de convocatoria*, and if he had used a network analysis to show interconnections and the flows of resources across various key webs. He could also have mapped out these networks and flows within and across urban centers to give us a better a sense of the spatial architectures informing NECs. Tools and research strategies of this sort are becoming indispensable to generate multi-scalar studies of Evangelicalism, or religion in general, for that matter.

Despite these shortcomings, *New Centers of Global Evangelicalism* is highly recommended. It takes the study of religion and politics in new, fruitful directions, introducing helpful and novel concepts and demonstrating the need to develop textured accounts of religious social forces and their differential interactions with cultural, economic, and political dynamics.

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Mariela Szwarcberg, *Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2015. Figures, tables, maps, notes, bibliography, index, 185 pp.; hardcover $89.99, paperback $32.99, ebook $26.

In this excellent book, Mariela Szwarcberg draws on extensive ethnographic research to bring the reader the most sensitive, nuanced portrayal of how clientelism works on the ground since Javier Auyero's *Poor People's Politics* was published in 2000. The 15 years since that time have seen an explosion of research on clientelism—the individualized exchange of goods and services for political support—in Latin America, especially Argentina. Yet even as scholars have debated what types of citizens are targeted via clientelism and why the practice works to accrue votes, the role of political intermediaries (brokers) has remained relatively understudied (though see Stokes et al. 2013). In this book, Szwarcberg illuminates the role of these brokers—their preferences, practices, and career trajectories—in clientelism. To do so, she draws on participant observation, extensive interviews, surveys, and data collection in a group of important cities in two Argentine provinces, supplemented with additional fieldwork in Lima, Peru.

In her book, Szwarcberg demonstrates that political brokers are embedded in networks of two different kinds. On the one hand, brokers are part of the social networks of the (usually poor) neighborhoods in which they live and work. In that capacity, brokers provide services, assistance in solving everyday problems, and even a sympathetic ear to citizens who come to rely on their support. The larger the circle of citizens who turn to a broker when in need, the greater the broker's network. On the other hand, brokers form part of explicitly political networks made up of party activists, candidates, and elected politicians in their municipality and even beyond. Brokers are often at the bottom of these political networks, seeking to advance their careers by becoming candidates for local office.

In her book, Szwarcberg shows how clientelism is a tool that enables brokers to serve both networks. By making assistance to local citizens part of an implicit

exchange for political activities, brokers are able to grow their political networks and prove their worth to higher-level politicians. This, in turn, is likely to advance a broker's career and enable the broker to gain access to even more resources—monetary and problem solving—that can be used to help voters.

How do brokers make clientelism work, both as a tool of citizen support and as part of a political career? In Szwarcberg's account, political rallies are a crucial space where brokers navigate the different networks in which they are inserted. On the one hand, rallies are moments in which brokers distribute benefits to voters—benefits that, she documents, may range from food and money to, in some cases, even alcohol and illegal drugs. On the other hand, as an activity that is much easier to observe than voting, rallies serve as an opportunity for brokers to show their capacity to mobilize support to other, higher-ranking politicians. Those attending rallies sit with "their" broker in identifiable groups, and brokers who hope to advance up the party hierarchy and achieve a place on a future ballot must meet or exceed the expectations of party leaders. The book's description of these rallies provides the reader with a unique window into the base-level dynamics of clientelism.

In addition, the importance of rallies to local politics in Argentina provides Szwarcberg with a novel measure of clientelism. The difficulties of documenting clientelism have been noted by most scholars of the phenomenon. Here, Szwarcberg's extensive fieldwork serves her exceedingly well. She convincingly argues that brokers who condition their assistance to voters on those voters' political support consistently take attendance at rallies. Taking attendance allows brokers to identify citizens who receive benefits but do not, in turn, provide political support, and then to punish these defectors, thereby making them an example to other citizens who might consider defecting.

Using in-depth interviews with political brokers and their close collaborators, Szwarcberg is then able to identify the share of brokers who employ clientelism in all but one of the eight cities under study. She shows that while many brokers use clientelism (take attendance at rallies), it is far from a universal practice. Szwarcberg's extensive data collection also allows her to connect brokers' behavior at rallies to their future political success, measured by their position on party lists and achievements in subsequent elections. She shows that in general, brokers who employ clientelism enjoy more political success going forward than those who opt not to.

And why would some brokers opt not to, if reliance on clientelism tends to breed success? In the book, Szwarcberg is particularly interested in variation in the use of clientelism among brokers from incumbent parties, who should have resources available to devote to clientelism. Thus, Szwarcberg distinguishes between what she calls "pragmatist" brokers—those who have the resources to use clientelism and do so—from so-called "idealist" brokers—those with resources who nevertheless opt not to rely on clientelism.

Although identifying these different categories of brokers is useful, Szwarcberg's explanation for these types leaves some open questions. In particular, in the book, brokers' decisions to use clientelism or not are attributed mostly to personal prefer-

ence and individual choices. This focus on the individual is understandable, given Szwarcberg's extensive knowledge of the individual candidates she discusses and the way brokers themselves describe their decisions. However, in focusing on individual agency, Szwarcberg may underplay the role of contextual and demographic factors in explaining clientelism and departures from it. So, for example, in explaining the rise of an alternative, nonclientelist party in mayoral elections in the city of Córdoba, Szwarcberg attributes the New Party's success to a split between pragmatist and idealist brokers in the previously ruling Peronist party (147). However, this account minimizes the role of structural factors—particularly a growing middle class with a distaste for clientelism—that probably encourage political actors to abandon the practice (Weitz-Shapiro 2014).

On the other hand, Szwarcberg's emphasis on the individual choices of brokers may, at times, provide an overly optimistic picture of the necessary conditions for political change and a departure from clientelism. Most telling in this respect is that in one of her chosen cities, Malvinas Argentinas, political life was so wholly controlled by the sitting mayor that she was unable to complete the interviews and participant observation carried out elsewhere. In such a context, an individual broker's "taste" for clientelism may be irrelevant. Future work might usefully explore how broker preferences interact with structural characteristics to shape the prevalence of clientelism, as well as its usefulness as a political tool.

As a final note, at a time when causal analysis gains much attention in political science, it is worth emphasizing that the author's decision to privilege the description of clientelist networks is a self-conscious one. At the beginning of the book, Szwarcberg states, the "detailed description of these [clientelistic] networks is an end in itself" (2). In her hands, this description not only sheds new light on how brokers fit into clientelistic networks, but it also provides for engrossing reading. It is not an exaggeration to say that *Mobilizing Poor Voters* is a page turner, a rare accomplishment for any work of social science. I am confident that the book will be required reading for students and scholars of clientelism across the social sciences. It should also serve as an example for any scholar seeking to place detailed description at the heart of his or her study.

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